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CRIMINAL LAW
United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Bonnett, was convicted on one count of conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 371, and fifty-six counts of bank fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1344. Bonnett appealed, contending that counts two
through forty-seven, could not stand because they were based on implied representation of adequate funds. Second, Bonnett argued that
the district court erred by admitting into evidence a letter from Moore,
who received loans on behalf of Bonnett, to the FDIC. Bonnett also asserted error in admitting evidence of other wrongful acts committed by
him. Finally, he contended that the trial court prejudicially denied him
the opportunity to impeach two witnesses.
The Tenth Circuit first explained that since Bonnett was charged
with violating both subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the United States,
as plaintiff, must prove that Bonnett knowingly executed a scheme or
artifice. In particular, the United States must prove that: (1) the scheme
defrauded the financial institution; and (2) the scheme enabled the defendant to obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises. Using these guidelines, the court held that
passing a series of worthless checks for the purpose of obtaining illegal
loans could constitute a scheme to defraud a financial institution. Immediately crediting a depositor's account while knowing that the checks are
drawn on insufficient funds constitutes false representation. Consequently, the court stated that the evidence supported a conviction under
either or both subsections. Second, the court upheld the district court's
decision to allow into evidence a letter from Moore to the FDIC. The
court found that the letter was properly admitted on the terms of a stipulation. Third, the court held that evidence of Bonnett's wrongful conduct was admissible to show that he had an established pattern, practice,
and demonstrated his knowledge and intent. Fourth, the court held that
Bonnett was not entitled to question an F.B.I. agent regarding an inconsistent statement made by a prosecution witness. The court reasoned
that the statement was not given under oath in a prior proceeding in
accordance with FED. R. EvID. 801 (D)(1). Furthermore, the witness was
not first confronted with the allegedly inconsistent statement as required by FED. R. EvID. 613 (B). The court reviewed the district court's
ruling on the admission and exclusion of evidence under the "abuse of
discretion" standard. The court found no abuse and, therefore, affirmed
the decision of the district court.
United States v. Bouck, 877 F.2d 828
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendants, Bouck and Day, appealed convictions of conspiracy,
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three separate counts of possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute, and one count of unlawful use of the telephone. Bouck and Day
contended that: (1) the government alleged one conspiracy but that its
evidence established multiple conspiracies, constituting a misjoinder
and necessitating a dismissal of the conspiracy count; (2) the government engaged in outrageous conduct, therefore, tainting the conspiracy
indictment; and (3) the court improperly admitted hearsay statements.
The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence showed only one conspiracy. The court also held that the government's use of an infiltrator did
not constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to fatally taint the conspiracy indictment. Moreover, the court held that in determining whether a
conspiracy has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, hearsay
statements may be considered. Finally, the court found that the evidence
presented was sufficient to sustain Bouck's conviction of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute.
United States v. Cardens, 864 F.2d 1528
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendants Cardenas and Rivera-Chacon appealed their convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and carrying a gun.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed their convictions. The court held that in
the absence of any evidence of tampering or alteration, the chain of custody of the seized cocaine was sufficiently established to support its admission into evidence, despite the unavailability of a custodial officer to
testify. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for carrying a firearm. The court reasoned that Cardenas had placed the gun in the truck within inches of his hand, and
attempted to conceal it. These facts were sufficient to establish power of
dominion and control over a firearm.
United States v. DeMasters, 866 F.2d 327
Author: Judge Bright, sitting by designation
The district court dismissed indictments against defendant, DeMasters, for violating provisions of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)
(1982) ("Act"), relating to the unlawful sale of wildlife taken in violation
of state law.
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the indictment, the Tenth
Circuit held that DeMasters's furnishing of guide services for hunting
wildlife did not constitute the "sale of wildlife" within the meaning of
the Act. The court reiterated that criminal provisions are to be construed narrowly, and that legislative history may not be used to bring
within a criminal statute conduct that is not clearly encompassed within
the ordinary meaning of the provision. Although DeMasters, through
exclusive lease arrangements with the landowners, controlled the property on which the hunt was conducted, and obtained an additional fee
conditioned on the successful killing of wildlife, the wild animals were
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not under his control so as to make him their seller. The Act was
amended in 1988 to specifically include guide services, but its prospective application does not affect the outcome of this case.
United States v. Harting, 879 F.2d 765
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Harting, sought reversal of his conviction for failing to
file federal income tax returns. Harting claimed that the district court
erred by incorrectly instructing the jury. First, Harting argued that the
jury should have been instructed on the element of willfulness alleging
that in good faith he misunderstood his duty to file. Second, Harting
claimed that the district court erred in its- instructions regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The Tenth Circuit held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction
as to any recognized defense, and the district court must instruct separately on the defense of good faith. The court reasoned-that since the
evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to accept Harting's
good faith defense, the failure to separately instruct the jury constituted
reversible error. The court, therefore, remanded for a new trial. In addition, the court held that the district court's instruction regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination was properly applied. The court reasoned that the privilege did not protect Harting from disclosing the
amount of his income.
United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendants ("Lane"), were convicted of interfering with the enjoyment of private employment because of race, color, religion or national
origin, under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C). The conviction was based on
Lane's involvement in the slaying, of Jewish talk show host Alan Berg.
Lane appealed, arguing: (1) sectiori 245(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional in
its application to the case; (2) the prosecution and conviction for killing
Berg in violation of the RICO statute barred any subsequent prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 245; (3) there was insufficient evidence, as
required by the due process clause, of certain elements of a section
245(b)(2)(C) violation; and (4) he was prejudiced by a joint trial.
In affirming the district court's finding, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 245(b)(2)(C) was sufficiently supported by the commerce power
of Congress. Consequently, the court held the statute constitutional,
even though it was unclear whether Congress also relied on the fourteenth amendment in its enactment. The court also held that prior convictions of RICO offenses did not bar, under a theory of double
jeopardy, prosecution under section 245(b)(2)(C). The court further
held that there-was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was motivated because of Berg's employment. Therefore, the evidence supported the convictions. Finally,
the court held that Lane did not establish he was prejudiced by a joint
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trial. The court determined that there was no prejudice because the
weight of the evidence against Lane and the other defendant was approximately the same. Moreover, the court concluded that the jury
properly followed the instructions against one defendant, and not
against the other.
United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 1483
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Levario, appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Levario also appealed an order to serve a term of supervised release following his prison term, claiming the district court lacked
statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit held that the government failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed because
the jury was asked to draw a contrary inference from the same evidence
supporting the conviction for possession with intent to distribute.
Therefore, the conspiracy charge was reversed. With regard to the conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the jury's finding that
Levario knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Finally, the court vacated the district court's order to serve a
term of supervised release because the legislature intended the statute
to become effective on November 1, 1987, and the crime was committed
prior to that date.
Lopez v. McCotter, 875 F.2d 273
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Lopez, a bail bondsman, was convicted in New Mexico
district court of aggravated assault on a police officer, attempted aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault on Antonio Ojinaga. Lopez
posted bond for Antonio's son, Rudy Ojinaga, who failed to satisfy the
conditions of his release on bond. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions, and Lopez petitioned the United States District
Court for habeas corpus relief. The district court granted habeas corpus
relief and plaintiff, McCotter, representing the Secretary of Corrections
for the State of New Mexico, appealed. First, McCotter asserted that
New Mexico's adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
("UCEA"), eliminated the common-law authority of Lopez, as a bondsman, to retake Ojinaga without following specified procedures. Second,
McCotter contended that the bail bondsman's privilege cannot shield
Lopez's conduct in assaulting the police officer.
The Tenth Circuit held that the relevant provisions of the UCEA
were narrow. Moreover, the UCEA's coverage, in view of the particular
statute as to bondsmen and the common law, gave no adequate notice to
Lopez of the state court's current construction. The result of the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was to retroactively render
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Lopez's conduct criminal by depriving him of his bail bondsman's privilege. The court stated that this was a violation of the due process dause.
The court thus affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief
regarding Lopez's convictions for attempted aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault on Antonio Ojinaga. Second, the court held that the
district court's instruction to the jury adequately protected Lopez. The
court reasoned that the instruction allowed the jury to decide whether
Lopez knew the man was a police officer. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief regarding Lopez's
conviction for aggravated assault of the police officer. The case was,
therefore, remanded for further proceedings.
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866
Per Curiam
The defendants were convicted of bid-rigging in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman Act) and appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The defendants petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the district court
improperly admitted certain co-conspirator statements pertaining to
jobs unrelated to the defendants. The defendants also asserted that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of a single, ongoing conspiracy to rig bids.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in admitting the statements of co-conspirators conditionally,
subject to their being connected up later. The court found that there
was ample evidence to prove the existence of a single, ongoing conspiracy and that the defendants were members of the conspiracy. Once the
defendants joined the conspiracy, they became criminally liable for all
acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, the government
was not restricted to asking questions which pertained solely to jobs
rigged by the defendants. The statements of co-conspirators regarding
jobs unrelated to the defendants were admissible to prove the mechanics and ongoing nature of the conspiracy. The court reaffirmed the defendants' conviction.
United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, an Indian juvenile, appealed his adjudication as a delinquent for committing the crime of arson. Defendant contended on appeal that the mens rea required under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 81, was intent to burn a building, and that the district court erred in
finding that knowing conduct was sufficient.
The Tenth Circuit held that "willfully and maliciously," within the
meaning of section 81, includes acts done with knowledge that burning
of a building is the practically certain result. Thus, the district court's
findings which established knowing conduct were sufficient to support
its conclusion that the defendant acted "willfully and maliciously." The
court also held that the jury could have found that the evidence estab-
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lished beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the requisite mens tea. The defendant's efforts to stop or ameliorate the damage
did not establish that he did not know that the consequences of his actions were practically certain to occur.
United States v. Nichols, 877 F.2d 825

Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Nichols, appealed convictions of conspiracy, continuing
criminal enterprise, twenty-one separate counts of possession of cocaine
with an intent to distribute, and eight separate counts of interstate travel
in aid of an unlawful enterprise. Nichols contended the district court
erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction. Nichols also argued
that the informant's conduct was so shocking and outrageous that Nichols' due process rights were violated.
The Tenth Circuit previously held that an entrapment instruction is
required when evidence of entrapment creates a factual issue as to "inducement" by the government. The court upheld Nichols' conviction.
The court reasoned there was no factual issue because the evidence
showed Nichols participated in cocaine distribution before the government informant arrived. The court also held that Nichols' due process
rights were not violated and consequently, no dismissal was warranted.
The court reasoned that a dismissal is only warranted where the conduct
of the informant is shocking, outrageous and has reached an intolerable
level. The court held that an intolerable level was not approached.
United States v. Pinelli, 887 F.2d 1461
Author: Judge Phillips
Defendants, ("Pinelli"), appealed their convictions of various gambling and tax statute violations. The Tenth Circuit upheld all the
convictions.
First, the court found abundant evidence from which a reasonable
jury could convict. Second, the court held that neither 18 U.S.C. § 1995
nor the applicable Colorado gambling statutes were unconstitutionally
vague or too broad. Third, the court determined that the inadvertent
submission of non-evidentiary materials to the jury was harmless error.
Fourth, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of the testimony of the government's expert witness. Fifth, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Pinelli's motion to suppress
evidence obtained from a court authorized wiretap. Finally, the court
found the Pinelli's motion for severance was not timely and thus denial
was within the district court's discretion.
United States v. Protex Industries, Inc., 874 F.2d 740
Author: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
Defendant, Protex Industries,Inc. ("Protex"), appealed its criminal
conviction under the "knowing endangerment" provision of the Re-
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source Conservation and Recovery Act, ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
On appeal, Protex contended that the district court: (1) rendered section 6928(e) unconstitutionally vague by allowing the "knowing endangerment" counts to go to the jury even though there was no evidence
that the employees were placed in imminent danger of serious bodily
injury as specifically defined by 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(6); (2) rendered the
section unconstitutionally vague by improperly instructing the jury on
the meaning of "imminent danger" in the statute; and (3) erred in not
giving a requested jury instruction in Protex's defense that the government failed to meet its statutory duty to provide results of on-site inspections to Protex.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had not erred and
affirmed the verdict. The court conduded that: (1) the employees had
incurred severe physical effects from prolonged exposure to toxic chemicals that were sufficient to constitute "serious bodily injury" even
though the specific condition was not set forth in the statute; (2) the jury
instruction using the term "reasonable expectation" as opposed to
"substantial certainty" in defining "imminent danger" was proper and
did not prevent Protex from predicting whether its conduct would violate RCRA, a necessary factor for unconstitutional vagueness; and
(3) the government's failure to notify Protex of its inspection results indicating violations of RCRA did not provide a defense to the criminal
charges.
United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Record, was convicted of conspiracy charges involving
cocaine and marijuana and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on
each of two counts. Record appealed alleging that: (1) the government's
evidence was insufficient to establish one continuous conspiracy and,
therefore, venue was improper; (2) the district court unduly emphasized
evidence harmful to the defense; and (3) the district court erroneously
admitted evidence of prior bad acts and inappropriately allowed the
government's closing argument to imply future crimes if acquitted.
In upholding one conspiracy, the Tenth Circuit ruled that venue
was proper because at least one overt act occurred in the district. Also,
the court held that Record failed to establish appropriate withdrawal
from the conspiracy. Moreover, the court ruled that evidence of prior
uncharged importation of marijuana was admissible because it was
highly probative and was admitted for a limited use, followed by a limiting instruction. In addition, the court found the prosecutor's closing argument harmless because of its limited and indirect nature and because
there was ample evidence of guilt. The court, therefore, affirmed the
district court's conspiracy conviction.
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United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Stewart, was convicted on twenty-nine counts of mail
and wire fraud and on one count of conspiracy to defraud. Stewart appealed, arguing that: (1) the mail and wire fraud statutes are unconstitutionally vague; (2) the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury
that the mail and wire statutes do not apply to intangible rights; (3) the
district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of common law fraud; (4) the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on certain provisions of antitrust laws; and (5) the restraining order issued by the district court was so broad it interfered with Stewart's right
of access to potential witnesses.
First, the Tenth Circuit stated that the test for impermissible vagueness is whether a person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice by
the statute that his conduct is forbidden. Moreover, the court stated that
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341, specific intent must be shown. The requirement of specific intent does not automatically rule out vagueness,
but it does eliminate objection of the accused being unaware of the statute's prohibition. The court found the indictment was sufficiently dear
to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Second, the district court
did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the mail and wire statutes
do not apply to intangible rights. The court reasoned that there were no
allegations in the indictment regarding intangible rights; only deprivation of property rights were alleged. Third, the district court did not err
in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of common law fraud. The
court reasoned that it was not error, because the statute does not require successful completion of the scheme to defraud. Fourth, the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on provisions of the
antitrust laws. The court reasoned that the provisions relating to nonprofit organizations were not applicable because even though Stewart
represented a nonprofit organization, the drugs were not being
purchased for the organizations own use. Fifth, the court held that if
there was error in the district court's granting of the temporary restraining order, it was harmless error. The judgment and convictions of
the district court were, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Voigt, was convicted of one count of conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), and forty-six counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. II 1984). Voigt appealed her
convictions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, jury disregard of
instructions, and admission of improper expert witness opinions.
Voigt asserted that she was inadequately represented by her counsel because he was under the influence of Demerol during most of the
six week trial. Voigt argued that her counsel's impairment was demon-
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strated by his: (1) failure to argue for severance; (2) inability to communicate with co-counsel; (3) failure to cross-examine a key witness;
(4) failure to ask for a limiting instruction with regard to the Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) evidence; and (5) decision not to put on direct evidence or
to allow Voigt to testify.
Two elements must be established to demonstrate that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require the reversal of a conviction.
First, it must be shown that counsel committed serious error so as to not
be functioning as comported by the sixth amendment. Second, it must
be established that but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
The Tenth Circuit held that Voigt did not establish that her counsel
failed to exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonable defense attorney. She also did not meet her burden of demonstrating a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's constitutionally defective
representation the result of the trial would have been different.
The court concluded that Voigt was not entitled to a new trial based
on jury misconduct. The court reasoned that Voigt supported her position with only the affidavit of a codefendant's counsel. Moreover, the
affidavit stated that according to one juror, Voigt's conviction was due to
her failure to testify. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) provides that ajuror may not
testify as to any matter occurring during jury deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind. The court refused
to disregard Rule 606(b) and looked upon this inquiry with disfavor.
Upholding the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that Voigt
failed to point out any error committed by the trial court regarding the
expert witness testimony. The verdict of the jury and the actions of the
district court were, therefore, affirmed.

